

Consciousness as Singularity

A Consciência enquanto Singularidade

La Consciencia como Singularidad

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Abstract:

The present paper assesses the definition and categorization of consciousness from the perspective of conscientiology. It begins with a succinct presentation of the panorama of the main explanatory theories about consciousness, more current today, grouping them in three ways: cataphatic, apophatic, and analogical. Next, the various definitions of consciousness within the scope of conscientiology are brought together, so that it can be understood whether a definition is offered that effectively accounts for what consciousness is, and in which of the ways these definitions fit. Once it is verified that the definitions proposed by conscientiology permeate the most varied routes and do not offer a broadly satisfactory definition, we run through the most fundamental existent categories in order to verify whether there is an adequate framework. Upon verifying that consciousness, in the conscientiological perspective, does not fit into either physical or logical/psychological objects, the possibility arises that consciousness can be explained on the basis of the category of singularities.

Resumo:

O presente trabalho se propõe a tratar da definição e categorização da consciência sob a ótica da Conscienciologia. Inicia com apresentação sucinta do panorama das principais teorias explicativas sobre a consciência, mais correntes atualmente, agrupando-as em 3 vias: a catafática, a apofática e a analógica. Em seguida, reúnem-se as várias definições de consciência no âmbito da Conscienciologia para que se possa compreender se é oferecida definição que efetivamente dê conta do que é a consciência e, em qual das vias essas definições se encaixam. Constatado que as definições propostas pela Conscienciologia permeiam as mais variadas vias e não oferecem definição amplamente satisfatória, percorre-se pelas categorias mais fundamentais existentes a fim de se verificar se há enquadramento adequado. Ao se verificar que a consciência na perspectiva conscienciológica não se enquadra nem nos objetos físicos, nem nos lógicos/psicológicos, desenvolve-se a possibilidade de a consciência poder ser explicada a partir da categoria das singularidades.

Resumen:

El presente trabajo se propone a tratar la definición y categorización de la conciencia bajo la óptica de la Conscienciología. Inicia con una breve presentación del panorama de las principales teorías explicativas sobre la conciencia, más corrientes actualmente, agrupándose en 3 vías: la catafática, la apofática y la analógica. Después, se reúnen las varias definiciones de conciencia en el ámbito de la Conscienciología para que se pueda comprender si es ofrecida una definición que afectivamente sea capaz de explicar lo que es la conciencia y, en cuales de las vías esas definiciones se encajan. Constatado que las definiciones propuestas por la Conscienciología permean las más variadas vías y no ofrecen definición ampliamente satisfactoria, se recorre por las categorías más fundamentales existentes a fin de verificar si hay encuadramiento adecuado. Al verificarse que la conciencia en la perspectiva conscienciológica no se encuadra ni en los objetos físicos, ni en los lógicos/psicológicos, se desenvuelve la posibilidad de que la conciencia pueda ser explicada a partir de la categoría de singularidades.

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INTRODUCTION

The study of what consciousness may be is rather complex and intricate, revolving basically around the following five fundamental questions, presented next in their functional order:

1. What is the consciousness?
2. What is the definition of consciousness?
3. Is it possible to know the consciousness?
4. Is it possible to investigate the consciousness?
5. How do we research the consciousness?

The present paper seeks to bring answers only to the first question, without prejudice to the fact that when tackling it, one ends up answering the other questions as well.

In this pursuit, the first section of the paper covers the main and most current theories in the scientific community regarding consciousness, to investigate whether the conscientiological approach is in some way in line with any of them.

To carry out this verification, however, it is also necessary to know what the conscientiological approach to consciousness actually refers to. For this reason, the second section of the paper, when taking this course, we mainly touch on the definitions presented by the proponent of conscientiology, Waldo Vieira (1932–2015).

Nevertheless, it is still found that there is a multiplicity of different definitions of consciousness, which are ultimately unable of conferring a clear identity to the studied object. Thus, it is understood that it is necessary to propose a new category to study the consciousness, namely the category of singularities. This is what section three is about.

Finally, the term singularity, on which the category proposed here to investigate the consciousness is based, goes back to the proposition made by John Duns Scotus (1266–1308), and more specifically by William of Ockham (1285–1347) (*haecceity*), both from the fourteenth century. However, it is methodologically based on the sense worked by Gilbert Simondon (1924–1989), and especially Gilles Deleuze (1925–1995), in the works referenced in the bibliography.

For all these reasons, the relevance and justification of this paper for the studies of conscientiology and the consciousness in general are also made explicit.

I. EXPLANATORY THEORIES ABOUT THE CONSCIOUSNESS

Throughout history, there have been several attempts to define, symbolize, or represent the consciousness in its most radical and profound condition.

Among many terms, consciousness has already been referred to, in a more or less symbolic way, using the following 68 expressions, listed hereunder in alphabetical order:

01. Absolute.
02. *Alpha*.
03. *Anima*.
04. *Astī*.
05. *Ātman*.
06. Awareness.

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07. Being.
 08. Cause.
 09. Clean Slate.
 10. Core.
 11. *Dasein*.
 12. Divine.
 13. Emptiness.
 14. Entirety.
 15. Entity.
 16. Essence.
 17. Eternal.
 18. Everything.
 19. Existence.
 20. Free Consciex (FC).
 21. Happiness.
 22. I.
 23. Immaterial.
 24. Immortal.
 25. Imponderable.
 26. Ineffable.
 27. Inexorable.
 28. Infinity.
 29. Inherence.
 30. Inner.
 31. Intimacy.
 32. Knower.
 33. Life.
 34. Light.
 35. Love.
 36. Lucidity.
 37. Monad.
 38. Motion.
 39. Motor.
 40. Nature.
 41. Nothing.
 42. Observer.
 43. *Onthos*.
 44. Peace.
 45. Perfect.
 46. Person.
 47. *Pneuma*.
 48. Primothosene.

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49. Principle.
 50. Purity.
 51. Quidity.
 52. Self.
 53. Silence.
 54. Singular.
 55. Space.
 56. Spark.
 57. Spirit.
 58. Subject.
 59. Substance.
 60. Timeless.
 61. Unconditional.
 62. Uncreated.
 63. Unlimited.
 64. Uno.
 65. Vacuum.
 66. Verb.
 67. *Void*.
 68. Vortex.

These are 68 examples that in practice, however, do not help us much to understand what the consciousness essentially is. They are in most cases representations, symbolism, metaphors, often quite abstract, vague, and random about what the consciousness is.

Also historically, schools, philosophies, and authors have tried to define and establish what the consciousness is along the most varied lines, ranging from the ontological to the theological spectrum. These lines can be grouped in the following three pathways:

A. Positive (or cataphatic) way: here it is understood that the consciousness can be investigated, understood, and determined by what it actually is, seeking to establish what the consciousness is directly. Examples of these routes are these four, in alphabetical order:

1. Aristotelianism: *diaphora* (differentiable); Aristotle (384 BCE–322 BCE).
2. Cataphatism: *kataphasis* (namable).
3. Hinduism: *Jñāna* (supreme knowledge).
4. Platonism: *theoria* (contemplation); Plato (428/427 BCE–348/347 BCE), and conventional science in general.

B. Negative (or apophatic) way: here it is understood that the consciousness cannot be investigated, understood, or determined directly, for what it is. For this reason, it does not seek to represent the consciousness directly, but indirectly, for what it is not. Examples of this route are the following five, listed in alphabetical order:

1. Apophaticism: *apophasis* (unnamable); Pseudo-Dionysius (late Vedic period).
2. Buddhism: *anatta* (non-self) or *sunyata* (emptiness); Siddhartha Gautama (563 BCE–483 BCE).
3. Hinduism: *neti neti* (neither this nor that); Adi Shankaracharya (788–820).

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4. Judaism: *tzimtzum* (contracting to hide); Maimonides (1135/1138–1204).
 5. Pyrrhonism: *adiaphora* (undifferentiated); Pyrrho of Elis (360 BCE–270 BCE).

C. Analog (or third way): here it is understood that consciousness cannot or should not be investigated, understood, and determined directly, but indirectly. However, not for what it is not, but for representation made by means of analogies. Examples of this way are the following two, stated in alphabetical order:

1. Neoplatonism: *kataphasis* + *apophasis*; Proclus (412–485).
2. Thomism: *analogia entis* (analogical entity); Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274).

Contemporaneously, there are the most varied theories to explain what consciousness is, among which are mainly the 19 listed below in alphabetical order and accompanied in parentheses by the name of one of its main authors or proponents (Hameroff *et al.*, 2023, p. 12):

01. Cartesian dualism (or substance dualism) (Descartes, 2005).
02. Classical idealism (Fichte, 2005).
03. Dual-aspect monism (Spinoza, 2009).
04. Eliminativism (Churchland, 1986).
05. Enaction (or enactivism) (Varela, Thompson & Rosch, 2017).
06. Global workspace theory (GWT) (Baars, 1997).
07. Higher order theories (HOT) (Rosenthal, 2005).
08. Illusionism (Hofstadter & Dennett, 1981).
09. Integrated information theory (IIT) (Massimini, Tononi & Anderson, 2018).
10. Mind-brain identity (MBI) (Place, 1956).
11. Mind-object identity (MOI) (Manzotti, 2017).
12. Naturalistic dualism (Chalmers, 1996).
13. Panprotopsychism (Russell, 2022).
14. Panpsychism (James, 1909).
15. Predictive processing theory (or predictive coding theory) (Parr, Pezzulo, & Friston, 2022).
16. Quantum theories, particularly the orchestrated objective reduction (ORCH) theory, or simply OR (Hameroff & Penrose, 2014).
17. Russellian monism within the scope of neutral monism (Nagel, 2012).
18. Sensorimotor theory (or sensorimotor approach) (O'Regan, 2011).
19. Social approaches to consciousness (SAC) (Durkheim, 1999).

II. THE CONSCIOUSNESS FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF CONSCIENTIOLOGY

Besides the above mentioned 19 theories, we would like to add one more, the twentieth: Conscientiology. Through it, we intend to answer the fundamental question about what the consciousness is.

Initially, it is necessary to understand that conscientiology, as a neoscience, based on the consciential paradigm, seeks to explain what consciousness is from the study of personal experiences of paraphenomena, especially human out-of-body experiences (OBE), also known as conscious projections (CP) or lucid projections (LP). These projections can occur in a variety of different ways.

They can be spontaneous (e.g. during sleep) or induced (e.g. by one's own will, through the use of specific techniques, or by elements external to the will, such as intake of hallucinogens or psychotropic drugs). They can also occur due to natural or traumatic causes; among the traumatic causes, near-death experiences (NDE) stand out.

From these personal experiences, a totally new epistemological field is constituted for the investigation of consciousness, called conscientiology, which, in the view of its proposer, is the "Science that deals with the comprehensive study of consciousness, carried out by the consciousnesses themselves, through their consciential attributes, vehicles of manifestation, and multidimensional consciential phenomena" (Vieira, 2009, p. 34).

In general, conscientiology proposes the study of the consciousness considered in itself, through at least the following five different lines, listed in alphabetical order:

1. Holomnemonic: consciousness = holomemory.

Example: "The consciousness, strictly speaking, is memory itself (...)" (Vieira, 2014a, p. 351).

2. Holosomatics: consciousness = holosoma ("the whole consciousness").

Example: "Conscientiology is the science that studies the 'whole' consciousness, in all its bodies, existences, experiences, times and places of life, in an integral, projective, and self-conscious approach in relation to the various existential dimensions" (Vieira, 2010, p. 7).

3. Paracerebral: consciousness = parabrains.

Example: "The parabrains are the nucleus of one's personal holothosene, that is: **consciousness** is the parabrains" (Vieira, 2014b, p. 1,209).

4. Synonymic: consciousness = "I", "you", "self", "intelligent principle", "ego".

Example: "I am the consciousness. You are the consciousness. Consciousnesses are also all people near or far, in human life, and all self-aware beings in the dimensions outside human life". "Consciousness is our greater reality, or we are, more than energy and matter" (Vieira, 2010, p. 7 and 20).

5. Tautological: consciousness is different from energy.

Example: "The Cosmos consists of two **fundamental realities**: consciousness and energy, or, in other words, thosene and Nature" (Vieira, 2014b, p. 538).

Through combinatorial analysis, it appears that these five conscientiological approaches fall into the three pathways in the following manner: the synonymic proposition can be framed in the cataphatic pathway, for example; the tautological definition, in the apophatic pathway; and the holomnemonic, holosomatic and paracerebral conceptions, in the analog pathway.

III. CATEGORY OF SINGULARITY TO EXPLAIN THE CONSCIOUSNESS FROM A CONSCIENTIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE

In view of this lack of definition within the scope of conscientiology itself, since neither the proposer has established which of the concepts prevails, nor is there a consensus among conscientiological researchers currently on this, to try to find a more concrete way to define consciousness from the conscientiological approach, it is proposed to begin with two very elementary questions:

1. Is consciousness a physical or organic object?

2. Is consciousness a psychological object or the mind itself?

To deepen the first question, the following six considerations are made, arranged in logical order, to know if the consciousness:

1. Belongs to the category of individuals for which the brain stands out prominently.
2. From a logical point of view, physical or organic objects can be classified as contingent or accidental. Furthermore, they establish relations of both designator and designated, because at the same time they designate physical reality, they are also designated by concepts formulated by logic. Regarding semiotics, they are the secondness (Santaella, 2009, p. 10).
3. It is physical, that is, if its meaning can be grasped from the physical or material world.
4. It is extensive, that is, if it is palpable and physically apprehensible.
5. It is subject to material or objective reality where objects are subject to the linearity of time, that is, to past-present-future successiveness.
6. It can be perceived through impressions by body sensory schemes, such as exteroception (five senses), interoception (perception of hunger, thirst, tiredness, stress, urination, defecation), proprioception (perception of kinesthesia or movement) and electrification (perception of electricity).

With regard to the second question, also with the purpose of further deepening the inquiry, four considerations are listed hereunder in logical order to determine whether the consciousness:

1. Is the psycho-organic subject, or some mental object, such as: engrams, imagos (or paraimagos), percepts (or parapercepts), cons (units of lucidity), subsumers (or linguistic structures) (Schlosser, 2021, p. 561), concepts (or constructs) (Bucke, 1905), and the ideas.

The sum of all objects may be called mental objects. These objects can be divided into mental images (objects originated by perception or imagination, such as the percepts, parapercepts, and imagos), and mental representations (objects not originating from perception or imagination, such as engrams, cons, and subsumers).

Concepts fall slightly outside these categories, which would, in theory, be mixtures of images and mental representations, notably percepts and imagos. And ideas, which would also be, theoretically, mental representations, but precisely because they are produced by reason, in a more autonomous way without being affected by other mental objects.

From a logical point of view, logical or psychological objects can be classified as universal, apodictic, or necessary. This is because after apprehending the individual objects of the physical world through perceptual schemes, the mind, due to its own functional (or physiological) structure, transforms them into mental images and representations and accommodates them in universal, apodictic, or necessary categories through the logical/psychological process of conceptualization, that is, transformation into concepts. In doing so, it transforms what existed individually in the physical world into universal concepts.

Take, for example, the perception of a certain chair. That chair is an individualized, isolated object belonging to the physical world. But to the extent that it is conceptualized, the concept of chair begins to exist in the mind, through logical and psychological processes. There is not only *an individualized chair*, but *the chair* as a universalized concept.

In addition, mental objects establish relationships as designators, as they denote the realities of the physical world through these logical/psychological categories. Regarding semiotics, they are the thirdnesses (Santaella, 2009, p. 11).

2. It can have its meaning apprehended from the mental, subjective, or formal world.

3. It is extensive, that is, apprehensible not physically through the experience of sensitivity, but through the transcendent faculties of man, such as memory (or holomemory), imagination, perception (or paraperception), lucidity, learning, understanding, and reasoning.

4. It is submitted not to the linearity of time, but essentially to the simultaneities of the present.

Different from the chronological time to which individuals are submitted, here it is about subjective, psychological time or, to a certain extent, chronemia (Bruneau, 1979, p. 429). These are the so-called “peaks of present” or “old presents” (Deleuze, 2005, p. 121). One of the peaks is the present of the past and the other is the present of the future, and between them is located the present of the present, as Augustine has already presented in his work *Confessions* (Augustine, 2017).

The aforementioned 19 theories, in general, place consciousness in one of these two categories, or a mixture of both, such as the double aspect theory. This makes their definitions of consciousness more related to the cataphatic pathway.

Conscientiology, in certain definitions, is also linked to the cataphatic pathway, as demonstrated. However, it clearly refutes the first category because in the conscientiological approach, the consciousness is not something physical, material, or inherent to the brain.

As for the second category, there is a relative approximation. Although it is clear that the consciousness is not a psychological object, image, or mental representation, there are conscientiological definitions that position consciousness as an attribute, structure, or mental aspect, as in the case of all definitions, except the tautological one.

However, any of these approaches seem sufficient to define, frame, and categorize consciousness according to the conscientiological perspective, as they do not allow to establish a path capable of defining, understanding, and investigating the consciousness in a manner consistent with such an approach, considering the following three assertions, arranged below in functional order:

1. It does not refer to consciousness itself, but rather its attributes (holosoma, holomemory, parabrain).
2. It refers to other terms and concepts that lack an appropriate definition (intelligent principle, self, ego, I/you).
3. They approach consciousness for what it is not (consciousness \neq energy), and not for what it actually is.

Such difficulties can be explained by the following four hypotheses, presented in functional order:

1. Consciousness is not a phenomenal or paraphenomenal object.
2. Consciousness is not observable, for the observer and the observed can never be the same thing.
3. Consciousness cannot be cognitively apprehended or conceptualized (impossibility of a mentalsoma-soma bridge).
4. We can only “be” the consciousness, but not perceive it.

Therefore, a new category is needed that can account for the consciousness in the light of conscientiology. It is proposed in this work that it is the category of singularities.

Traditionally, it would be said that the essence of the consciousness is metaphysical, that is, its meaning can only be grasped or inferred from a transcendent reality. In general, metaphysical transcendence is linked to the category of universals, precisely because it occurs outside the experience of the physical world. According to Husserl (2019), for example, the logical is transcendental.

For Plato (2010), the intelligible, as opposed to the sensible, is also transcendental. For Kant, transcendental aesthetics and transcendental analytics are constituted (Kant, 2001, p. 31 and 74, respectively) as a function of sensitive objects going through the process of conceptualization and transcendental dialectics (Kant, 2001, p. 350) because they are products of reason whose active faculty is also transcendental.

However, although transcendent, they are not real because they do not exist materially, or because they are nothing more than processes that produce mental objects without corresponding exactly and necessarily with the objects existing in the physical world. In other words, mental images do not correspond identically to individual objects and mental representations do not correspond remotely and much less identically.

However, here, transcendence is understood differently from traditionally adopted conceptions. From a conscientiological point of view, it is not appropriate to say that the meaning of the consciousness or essence can be extracted from metaphysics, but from extraphysics or extraphysicality.

In the category of singularities, reality, although transcendent, is real. The transcendental is not taken in Kantian or Platonic terms, or as something that refers to the logical or psychological plane, nor to that of experimentation linked to individuality, but rather to that of singularity, where what remains, after removing the contingent and universal aspects, is the metaphysical essence (Deleuze, 1975, p. 113).

Therefore, regarding time, consciousness as a singularity is subject neither to the linearity or successiveness of individual objects, nor to the simultaneity of logical or psychological objects. The consciousness is not subject to either of these two temporal types. Its relationship with time is much more associated with timelessness.

As for the past, it is associated with the pure past, such as reminiscences, *déjà-vus*, folds or sheets of the past, and infinite holomemory.

As for the present, it is connected to the pure present, where everything that does not change or absolutely alter resides. Because changing ceases to be and becomes part of the plane of strict existence. Moreover, only that which is capable of being affected, that is, of perishing somewhere, can change. Because the consciousness does not perish anywhere, it cannot be subjected to a linearity of time, as everything that exists, dissolves. Therefore, the consciousness is situated in an eternal present as in the conscientiological conception it does not perish.

As for the future, the consciousness connects with the pure future, following the example of the coming-to-be, aeonic cycles, and the eternal return of futures released from absolute and infinite potentialities.

In addition, the consciousness would not have extension either. It is not extensive either in relation to the physical world or in relation to the mind. The consciousness would be something intense; not an extensiveness as in the case with objects, but an intensity, being, for this reason, much more associated with a force, a soul, that animates and vitalizes objects. Precisely because it is not extensive, the consciousness would be the pre-individual form, or that which generates organic individuality and the psychological subject.

In the same way, it would also not be perceptible, evidently, either through the sensory scheme of the physical body, or through the already mentioned transcendent faculties of man. The consciousness is amorphous, that is, it has no form, no structure, nor does it establish relationships. Any functionalist, analytical, or structuralist attempts, for example, to explain the consciousness are completely in vain. Therefore, from the perspective of semiotics, the consciousness could be placed as a firstness (Santaella, 2009, p. 11).

The interesting thing about the conscientiological approach is the opening up of the possibility of experimentation, or more specifically self-experimentation, to get to know the announced realities in practice. In the case of the consciousness as a singularity, it is understood that such experiential knowledge would result, in particular, from the experience of the state of cosmoconsciousness. This is stated because it is understood that what can be

experienced during this state (Marchioli, 2023) is very close to the description presented here of the consciousness as a singularity.

CONCLUSION

With the research carried out, the conclusion reached is that, although the consciousness cannot be adequately defined by any of the three pathways investigated, the apophatic one has a greater ability to provide a closer or more appropriate description, because it takes more into account the features of the singularity that distinguish it. In this sense, the tautological definition is the most promising among the five found, within the scope of conscientiology, especially those presented by its proposer.

Furthermore, the category of singularities proved to have broader potential to be explored, as apparently it really offers the descriptive elements that come closest to the reality of consciousness, particularly when seen from the perspective of the phenomenon of cosmoconsciousness.

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